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Throughout Europe, South America, and North America 
there exist systems for extra-contractual reparations for per- 
sonal physical injury or property damage caused by the sub- 
standard conduct of others. The tort law of the United States, 
and that of other common law countries, derived in a labored 
but largely undistracted path from the common law of England. 
In contrast, in continental Europe, Central America and South 
America, the jurisprudence of such civil liability has developed 
within the procedural matrix and the cultural expectations of 
their respective civil codes.1 
Many observers have quailed at the prospect of identifying 
similarities between and among the diverse civil code treat- 
ments of liability for "negligence," a concededly common law no- 
menclature. Such observers often note that the civil code 
maturation through the original Napoleonic Code and the 
greatly influential adaptation of that code in Chilean law is sim- 
ply too incongruous a presentation of cultural commitment to 
justice for victims of unintentional injury to ever be reconciled 
meaningfully with common law negligence. 
An examination of the contemporary Colombian civil code 
treatment of extra-contractual liability for harm (daiio) to per- 
sons or property in fact reveals a system, similar in many re- 
spects to the civil code regimens of other Latin American 
nations, in which the similarities with the policies of common 
law negligence actually dwarf the distinctions, or at  least re- 
duce most of the distinctions to  formalisms. 
This article will describe essential nature of the Anglo- 
American development of the common law negligence compo- 
nents of duty, breach, and damages. There follows a detailed 
1 Such civil codes find their rootstock in Roman law and the Napoleonic 
Code. See Richard Azarnia, Tort Law in France: A Cultural and Comparative 
Overview, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 471, 471 (1995). 
Heinonline - -  13 Pace Intl'l L. Rev. 60 2001 
20011 UNITED STATES AND COLOMBlAN TORT LAW 6 1 
discussion of the origins of Colombian liability (responsibilidad) 
for unintentional harms to persons or property (daiios). In the 
course of the latter discussion, distinctions, variations and pol- 
icy tangencies will be identified and discussed. 
A. Generally 
The Anglo-American development of the doctrine of liabil- 
ity for negligent acts causing harm to others or to their property 
followed a lengthy legal devotion to liability without fault, or 
strict liability.2 Some scholars have associated the perfection of 
fault-based liability with the Industrial Revolution in England.3 
However, observers seem not to have established satisfactorily 
whether negligence liability was a mechanism of legal benevo- 
lence to persons and chattels or instead a legal prophylaxis that 
reduced the potential liability of businesses by requiring the pu- 
tative plaintiff to prove not only injury and causation, but also 
that the actor had proceeded with an absence of due care under 
the circumstances.4 
Modern negligence law is concerned primarily with the pro- 
vision of reparations to persons suffering personal injury or 
property loss due to a failure of others to act with due care 
under the circumstances. It is established that (1) tort law is 
devoted to the protection of persons and property from unrea- 
sonable risk of harm; and (2) the actor's liability in tort is lim- 
ited by concepts of reasonable foreseeability. Employing as an 
example the law of products liability, it is possible to state a 
rule for negligence liability for the sale of an unreasonably dan- 
gerous product: A product seller is liable in negligence if he acts 
See generally DAN B .  DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 259-63 (2000). 
3 The development of negligence law "was probably stimulated a good deal by 
the enormous increase of industrial machinery and by the invention of railways in 
particular." P. WINFIELD, LAW OF TORT 404 (5th ed. 1950). 
4 Compare WINFIELD, id.  ("At that time railway trains were notable for 
neither speed nor for safety. They killed any object from a Minister of State to a 
wandering cow, and this naturally reacted upon the law.") with Robert J. Kazorow- 
ski, The Common-Law Basis of Nineteenth-Century Tort Law, 51 OHIO S.L.J. 1 
(1990) (referencing scholarly proponents of theory that negligence liability arose in 
a court-stimulated effort to moderate the liability of businesses and to permit devo- 
tion of industrial capital to production rather than to satisfaction of legal liability). 
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or fails to act in such a way as to create an unreasonable risk of 
harm or loss to the user of a product or to another who might 
foreseeably be injured thereby, and such act or omission is the 
legal cause of the claimant's harm. 
More broadly, the contemporary United States cause of ac- 
tion for negligence requires the plaintiff to  prove that (1) the 
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant 
breached that duty; (3) that the defendant's breach was the 
cause in fact and the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury or 
loss; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered harm compensable in 
tort. This segment of the article will be devoted only to  a discus- 
sion of Anglo-American legal treatment of the first two dimen- 
sions of the plaintiffs cause of action in negligence: (1) duty; 
and (2) breach, and (4) compensable damages. Two theoretical 
models serve as a backdrop for consideration of modern Anglo- 
American treatment of duty and breach in negligence law. Con- 
siderations of corrective justice and economic efficiency each 
contribute distinctive but largely harmonious analytical 
threads. 
B. Corrective Justice 
In general terms, corrective justice proponents advance the 
proposition that the judiciary should promote a rights-based ju- 
risprudence grounded in moral  precept^.^ Even among those 
observers who would not subscribe wholeheartedly to  this pro- 
position, there is probably a consensus that if moral precepts 
are not to be the primary values supported, justice and moral- 
ity-based goals still form a necessary if not sufficient founda- 
tional element of modern tort law.6 The moral authority of any 
5 See Vincent A. Wellman, Conceptions of the Common Law: Reflections on a 
Theory of Contract, 41 U .  MIAMI L. REV. 925,925 n.l(l987) (citing RONALD WOR- 
KIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 1-130 (rev. ed. 1977), in which Dworkin "pro- 
pound[~] a rights-based theory of law and a corresponding obligation of judges to 
consider moral precepts when deciding significant cases"). 
6 I t  is agreed generally that only a wrong can transgress a moral imperative, 
in the sense that a harm befalling a plaintiff with no predicate negligence or viola- 
tion of some other doctrinal imperative, such as liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities, creates no rectificatory duty of any actor. Ernest Weinrib might point to 
tort doctrine as common law in which wrongdoing is a necessary, but not individu- 
ally adequate, component of liability. See Martin A. Kotler, Utility, Autonomy and 
Motive: A Descriptive Model of the Development of Tort Doctrine, 58 U .  CIN. L. REV. 
1231, 1240 (1990) ("[Wlrongdoing of a party is an essential factor in the decision to 
Heinonline - -  13 Pace Intl'l L. Rev. 62 2001 
20011 UNITED STATES AND COLOMBIAN TORT LAW 63 
law turns upon the perception that its tenets lead to  just re- 
s u l t ~ . ~  There is widespread agreement that a core considera- 
tion in any modern contemplation of "justice" would be the goal 
of "corrective" justice, i.e., a result that to the extent possible 
deprives the wrongful party of his gain, and restores the injured 
party to the position he enjoyed before the harm.8 Holmes ex- 
plained: "Be the exceptions more or less numerous, the general 
purpose of the law of torts is to secure a man indemnity against 
certain forms of harm to person, reputation, or estate, at the 
hands of his neighbors . . . . "9 
C .  Economic Efficiency 
Richard Posner and others call for a scientific ethic of 
wealth maximization, a so-called "efficiency norm."lO Many 
have responded to this call, with one influential commentator 
concluding that "much (though by no means all) of modern tort 
impose liability. . . ." (citing Ernest J. Weinrib, The Morality of Tort Law, Address 
to the Tort Law Section, Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting 
(Jan. 9, 1988))). 
7 See READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 37 (Jerome Hall ed., 1938) ("As Augustine 
says (De Lib. Arb i.5), that which is not just seems to be no law a t  all: wherefore 
the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice."); cf. Randy E. Barnett, Get- 
ting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 12 
CONST. COMM. 93, 105-13 (1995) (arguing that for constitutional procedures to be 
legitimate, they must be of such a nature as to bind in conscience). 
8 Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 53 (David Owen ed., 1995) ("[Clorrective justice is the 
principle that those who are responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a 
duty to repair them, and that the core of tort law embodies this conception of cor- 
rective justice."). 
9 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 115 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 
Little, Brown & Co. 1963) (1881) (emphasis added). In addition, Henry Sumner 
Maine observed: "Now the penal Law of ancient communities is not the law of 
Crimes; it is the law of Wrongs, or, to use the English technical word, of Torts. The 
person injured proceeds against the wrong-doer by an ordinary civil action, and 
recovers compensation in the shape of money-damages if he succeeds. . . . [All such 
Torts] gave rise to an Obligation or vinculum juris, and were all requited by a 
payment of money." HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH 
THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS ITS RELATION 
TO MODERN IDEAS 370 (1866). 
10 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Ef i -  
ciency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980). 
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law is at least roughly consistent with a Posnerian economic 
analysis."ll 
Numerous analysts have identified a common law tropism 
towards efficiency.12 Importantly, scholars have also concluded 
that efficient rules of law actually predict efficient litigation 
strategies, including settlement strategies. As stated by 
Ramona L. Paetzold and Steven L. Willborn, "[wlhere both par- 
ties to  a dispute have a continuing interest in precedent, the 
parties will settle if the existing precedent is efficient, but liti- 
gate if the precedent is inefficient."l3 Wes Parsons, even while 
disputing these premises, collected scholarship revealing in fact 
the broad range of cost internalization achievements of evolving 
common law doctrine.14 Included in Parsons's review was 
scholarly attribution to the common law of accidents as 
"promot(ing) efficient resource all0cation;"~5 the efficiencies of 
the common law of rescue, salvage and Good Samaritan assis- 
tance;l6 the efficiency of the common law damages rule for an- 
ticipatory repudiation of contract;17 and the efficiency of the 
economic loss rule in tort.ls 
A leading exponent of the efficiency role of the common law 
of tort has been Dean, and now Judge, Guido Calabresi, who 
argues persuasively that in matters of compensation for acci- 
dents, civil liability should ordinarily be laid at the door of the 
l1 Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law 
Really Deter?, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 377, 381 (1994) [hereinafter G. Schwartz, 
Deterrence]. 
12 E.g., George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Effi- 
cient Rules, 6 J .  LEG. STUD. 65 (1977); Ramona L. Paetzold and Steven L. Willborn, 
The Efficiency of the Common Law Reconsidered, 14 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 157 
(1991)[Hereinafter Paetzold and Willborn]. 
13 Paetzold and Willborn, supra note 13. 
14 Wes Parsons, Note, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE L.J. 862 (1983). 
15 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of 
Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 852 (1981). 
16 William A. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Savors, Finders, Good Samaritans 
and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J .  LEG. STUD. 83, 
128 (1977). 
17 Thomas H. Jackson, 'Anticipatory Repudiation' and the Temporal Element 
of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Cases of Prospec- 
tive Nonperformance, 31 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1978)("compensating the aggrieved 
party for its entire expectation loss, without overcompensating it, is a n  economi- 
cally sound principle in  that  i t  facilitates the movement of goods and services to 
their higher value user." Id. a t  69). 
18 W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 1, 2-3 (1982). 
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"cheapest cost avoider," the actor who could most easily discover 
and inexpensively remediate the hazard. Together with A. 
Douglas Melamed, Calebresi states that, particularly in the set- 
ting of environmental harm, considerations of economic effi- 
ciency dictate placing the cost of accidents "on the party or 
activity which can most cheaply avoid them[.]"lS A lucid adop- 
tion of this approach is found in the Ninth Circuit decision of 
Union Oil Co. v. O~pen ,~O a California coastal oil spill case in 
which the court allowed commercial fishermen to  recover from 
defendant their business losses caused by lost fishing opportu- 
nity during a period of pollution. Noting some difficulties in ap- 
plying the "best or cheapest cost avoider" approach in concrete 
circumstances, the court followed Calabresi's requirement that 
it "exclude as potential cost avoiders those groups \ activities 
which could avoid accident costs only at  extremely high ex- 
pense."2l This approach, to the mind of the appeals court, mili- 
tated against the conclusion that the cost of preventing or 
repositioning the loss should be borne directly by consumers 
(fishermen or seafood purchasers) in the form of precautionary 
measures (whatever they might hypothetically be), or by first 
party insurance. Rather, the court found, justice and efficiency 
were served by placing responsibility for the loss on the "best 
cost avoider," in this setting the defendant oil company. The 
court explained its reasoning: 
[Tlhe loss should be borne by the party who can best correct any 
error in allocation, if such there be, by acquiring the activity to 
which the party has been made liable. The capacity to "buy out" 
the plaintiffs if the burden is too great is, in essence, the real focus 
of Calabresi's approach. On this basis, there is no contest - the 
defendant's capacity is superior.22 
19 Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096-97 (1972). See also MARK C. 
RUDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS: INSURANCE, LIABILITY AND TORT 29, 32-33 
(Temple 1995). 
20 Union Oil Co. v. Open, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974). 
21 Id. at 569. 
22 Id. at 569-570. 
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When it is claimed that an actor owed a duty to a plaintiff, 
the duty described is that of ordinary care, or care commensu- 
rate with that which would be expected of a reasonable man 
under the same or similar circumstances. The duty is not owed 
to  a public generally, but rather to  those whom the actor, look- 
ing prospectively with the eye of reasonable vigilance, would 
perceive to be put at  an unreasonable risk of harm or loss 
should the actor proceed incautiously, or with an absence of due 
care.23 The decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court in Brown v. Kendull24 put the proposition in these influ- 
ential words: ' 'What constitutes ordinary care will vary with 
the circumstances. . . . In general it means that kind and de- 
gree of care, which prudent and cautious men would use, such 
as is required by the exigency of the case."25 
Duty is relational, which is to say that for a duty to exist, it 
must be associated with a particular person or a particular class 
of person within which the plaintiff finds him~elf.~6 Thus as it 
23 The proposition . . . . is that whenever one person is by circumstances 
placed in such a positionwith regard to another that every one of ordinary 
sense . . . would a t  once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and 
skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances, he would 
cause danger of injury to the person or property of another, a duty arises 
to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger. 
Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (C.A. 1883) (Brett, M.R.). 
24 Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850). 
25 Id. at 296. 
26 The element of duty establishes that there is a legally recognized rela- 
tionship between the plaintiff and the defendant and the plaintiff that 
obligates the defendant to act (or refrain from acting) in a certain manner 
toward the plaintiff. . . . . Whether a duty exists is largely a policy-based 
determination. [Where the presence or absence of duty constitutes an is- 
sue to be decided by the court, "a judge oRen balances such factors as the 
forseeability of the harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury; the closeness of the connections between the de- 
fendant's conduct and the injury suffered; the policy of preventing future 
harm; the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the commu- 
nity of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach; 
and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk 
involved." 
Heinonline - -  13 Pace Intl'l L. Rev. 66 2001 
20011 UNITED STATES M D  COLOMBZM TORT LAW 67 
has been said that negligence "air" does not exist,27 and neither 
does its predicate, duty. Returning to the model of products lia- 
bility law, MacPherson u. Buick Motor Co.28 secured its position 
as a lynchpin in the development of products liability by provid- 
ing persuasive arguments as to three propositions governing 
the duty of manufacturers. The opinion of Judge Cardozo is 
greatly informative in its evaluation of duty as affected by the 
variability of risk, the foreseeability of that risk should the ac- 
tor proceed without due care, and the identification of the class 
of persons to whom duty is owed. The three propositions were 
these: (1) a manufacturer owes a duty of due care to not only its 
immediate vendee, but also to remote vendees who in the ordi- 
nary course may be expected to purchase the product; (2) the 
duty is not confined to the manufacture and sale of so called 
imminently dangerous products, but instead to  all products that 
could be expected to do substantial harm to others if not made 
with care appropriate to the pertinent risks; and (3) this duty of 
due care is nondelegable, and thus even if it is a component part 
of the product that causes its injurious failure, the manufac- 
turer of the overall product may remain liable. 
MacPherson stood for the principle that although manufac- 
turers of all products would be held to a standard of ordinary 
care under the circumstances, the ordinary care expected of a 
manufacturer of locomotives would logically involve a higher 
level of scrutiny than would the "ordinary care" that one might 
expect of a the weaver of fruit baskets, as the risk of harm from 
a negligently manufactured locomotive is incalculably greater 
than that created by a defectively fashioned basket. Each of the 
rules advanced in MacPherson: (1) the injured plaintiffs negli- 
gence remedy against the remote manufacturer without regard 
to privity; (2) the finished product seller's responsibility (or 
duty) for the prudent design and the manufacturing integrity of 
component parts; and (3) the manufacturer's duty to conduct 
reasonable and necessary tests on the product before its intro- 
duction into commerce, represents the established majority rule 
in tort today. 
27 See Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown, 95 N.J. 280, 471 A.2d 25, (19841, 
quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, THELAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1971)(while facts may indi- 
cate negligence in the air, "it is still necessary to bring it home to the defendant."). 
28 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
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Further illustrative of modern interpretation of duty in tort 
law is the New York decision in DiPonzio v. Riordan.29 That 
suit involved injuries sustained by a filling station patron when 
another customer's car, left running as the latter paid his bill 
inside, slipped either into gear or into neutral and backed into 
plaintiff, injuring his leg. Plaintiff and his wife sued the car 
owner and the filling station. As to the filling station, plaintiffs' 
theory was that it "had been negligent in failing to properly 
train its attendants and that its attendants had been negligent 
in failing to comply with [station's] rules requiring that custom- 
ers be warned to turn off their engines while fueling their 
vehicles."30 
The Supreme Court denied defendant's motion for sum- 
mary judgment, in which defendant argued "the lack of any cog- 
nizable duty, the lack of a proximate causal relationship 
between its alleged negligence, if any, and the accident, and the 
unforeseeability of the accident."3l The Appellate Division 
reversed. 
The New York Court of Appeals identified the "threshold" 
inquiry as being "whether [the station] had a legally cognizable 
duty" to take measures to prevent this accident. Acknowledg- 
ing that a business proprietor's duty extends to "maintain[ing] 
their property in a reasonably safe condition[,]" and that the 
duty "may extend to  controlling the conduct of third persons 
who frequent or use the property, a t  least under some circum- 
stances[,]" the court observed that these duties are "not limit- 
l e~s . "3~  Drawing upon the Palsgraf, v. Long Island R.R., the 
Court reiterated that "[tlhe risk reasonably to be perceived de- 
fines the duty to be obeyed."33 Applying this standard, the 
Court of Appeals concluded there could be no service station lia- 
bility, as "DiPonzio's injuries did not arise from the occurrence 
of any of the hazards that the duty would exist to prevent." The 
Court's reasoning continued: 'When a vehicle's engine is left 
running in an area where gasoline is being pumped, there is a 
29 DiPonzio v. Riordan, 89 N.Y.2d 578, 679 N.E.2d 616, 657 N.Y.S.2d 377 
(1997). 
30 Id. at 581-82. 
31 Id. at 582. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 583 (citing Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 
99). 
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natural and foreseeable risk of fire or explosion because of the 
highly flammable properties of the fuel. . . . It is this class of 
foreseeable hazards that defines the scope of [the] station's pur- 
ported duty. The occurrence that led to plaintiffs injury was 
clearly outside of this limited class of hazards." 
Further illustrative of the boundaries that will be imposed 
upon an actor's duty is one decision requiring the court's consid- 
eration of whether a manufacturer's duty, and potential liabil- 
ity, in a DES case should be extended to the generation born not 
of the mother who ingested the DES, but rather to the second 
generation, which is to say, the offspring of the DES daughter. 
The Ohio Supreme Court offered a telling treatment of the logi- 
cal limits of an actor's duty in Grover v. Eli Lilly & C O . , ~ ~  follow- 
ing a federal trial court certified this issue to the Ohio Supreme 
Court in the setting of a grandchild's claim, through his repre- 
sentatives, that his severe birth defects were caused by defects 
in the mother's reproductive system, which defects were earlier 
caused by the grandmother's ingestion of the drug DES. The 
court noted that courts in some other jurisdictions, on similar 
but distinguishable facts, had not permitted actions to proceed 
for such "preconception" torts.35 The Ohio high court noted Pal- 
sgraf v. Long Island RR. Co.36 for the proposition that "[aln ac- 
tor does not have a duty to a particular plaintiff unless the risk 
to that plaintiff is within the actor's 'range of apprehension."'37 
Finding no cause of action inuring to the grandchild, the Grover 
court explained: 
When a pharmaceutical company prescribes drugs to a woman, 
the company, under ordinary circumstances, does not have a duty 
to her daughter's infant who will be conceived twenty-eight years 
later. Because of remoteness in time and causation, we hold that; 
the grandchild] does not have an independent cause of action, and 
answer the district court's question in the negative. A pharma- 
34 591 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio 1992). 
35 The court noted Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1989)(cause of action against mother's physicians for failure to inoculate mother 
with rubella vaccine prior to child's conception) and Renslow v. Mennonite Hospi- 
tal, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (111. 1977) (negligence action by child against hospital that 
negligently gave mother Rh-positive blood eight years before, stimulating Rh-posi- 
tive antibodies that injured the fetus). 
36 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928). 
37 591 N.E.2d 696, quoting Palsgraf, 162 N.E. a t  100. 
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ceutical company's liability for the distribution or manufacturer of 
a defective prescription drug does not extend to persons who were 
never exposed to the drug, either directly or in ~ t e r o . ~ ~  
IV. BREACH OF DUTY 
To locate the line between an actor's fulfillment of its duty 
to  others and its breach of that duty, courts in numerous juris- 
dictions employ the formulation of Judge Learned Hand, or a 
harmonious risk-benefit mode1.39 This primitive but enor- 
mously influential calculus was offered in a negligence context 
by Judge Learned Hand in the opinions in United States v. Car- 
roll Towing Co.,*O and Conway v. 0'Brien.41 In those two cases, 
the court stated that "the degree of care appropriate to a situa- 
tion is the result of the calculus using three factors: the likeli- 
hood that the conduct will injure others, multiplied by the 
seriousness of the risk if it happens, balanced against the bur- 
den of taking precautions against the risk."42 The formula is 
known to many as B (Burden) c P (Probability of Harm) * L 
(Magnitude of Loss Should It Occur).43 The Learned Hand ap- 
proach can be conformed to more modern utilitarian analysis by 
visualizing B as encompassing not only the particular burden of 
precautionary measures upon the actor, but also the burden 
upon society if the conduct must either be eliminated due to lia- 
bility rules, or made more expensive by requiring precautionary 
measure and therefore beyond the economic reach of many.44 
38 Id. a t  700-01 . 
39 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.1947). 
40 159 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
41 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940). 
42 M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY (2d) 5 4.2 at 108 (1988). 
43 Of Hand's formula, Posner writes: 
This is an economic test. The burden of precautions is the cost of avoiding 
the accident. The loss multiplied by the probability of the accident is the 
expected accident cost, i.e., the cost that the precautions would have 
averted. If a larger cost could have been avoided by incurring a smaller 
cost, efficiency requires that the smaller cost be incurred. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 122 (2d ed. 1977) (citations 
omitted). 
44 Likewise in keeping with a utilitarian view that transcends the concerns of 
the individual plaintiff and defendant, consideration of the factors P (Probability of 
Harm) and the L (Magnitude of the Loss should it occur) would be enlarged to 
contemplate the likelihood of harm to others identically or similarly situated, and 
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Applying this negligence evaluation to a hypothetical per- 
sonal injury claim arising from a vehicular collision in which 
the plaintiffs injuries were caused by this design defect in the 
automobile: a rear positioned gas tank particularly susceptible 
to rupture, creating the risk of conflagration in a collision. 
These facts would support a finding of manufacturer negligence 
if one agrees that on the right side of the equation there is a 
measurable risk that any motor vehicle will be struck from the 
rear at some time during its useful life, and if one agrees fur- 
ther that the type of injury that might follow from the rupture 
of a gas tank in a collision is very great indeed. Turning to the 
left side of the equation, suppose the financial burden to the 
manufacturer of either using a more sturdy material for the 
tank, or placing the tank in a more forward position beneath the 
vehicle, was only a matter of $200 per car. The claimant would 
argue that such a cost is certainly moderate, and is, in any 
event, less than the risk of some harm multiplied by the seri- 
ousness of that harm (death or serious bodily harm) should the 
design change not be undertaken. If the assumptions in this 
hypothetical are accepted, a plaintiff injured in this way should 
be able to make out a prima facie case that the manufacturer 
has breached its duty of care. 
A. Generally 
Compensatory damages are those damages awardable to a 
person as compensation, indemnity, or restitution for harm or 
loss caused by the tortious act of another.45 One principal goal 
of compensatory damages is to place the person in the position 
they were in before the injury or loss, at  least insofar as money 
damages can do so, which is to say compensatory damages "are 
designed to place [the injured party1 in a position substantially 
equivalent in a pecuniary way to that which he would have been 
in had no tort been ~ommitted."4~ A second goal is that of deter- 
ring similar tortious conduct in the future, be it undertaken by 
the magnitude of the potential harm, not only in terms of the individual plaintiff 
but also to the population exposed to the risk. 
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 903. 
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 9 903 cmt. 
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the defendant or  by others.47 Restatement Second, Torts 8 901 
(6 summarizes the purposes of tort damages as: to give compen- 
sation, indemnity, and restitution for harms *** to  determine 
rights *** to punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct *** 
and to vindicate parties and deter retaliation of violent and un- 
lawful self-help."48 
A claimant's non-economic harm is ordinarily distinguished 
from his economic harm. Often also termed pecuniary loss, eco- 
nomic loss includes such loss as to which a monetary value can 
be assigned with some level of experience-based reliability. Ex- 
amples of economic harm would be past and future lost wages, 
or the cost of past and anticipated medical care, physical reha- 
bilitation and the like. Non-economic damages are less suscep- 
tible of reliable monetary valuation. Such non-economic 
damages can include, without limitation, indemnity for a claim- 
ant's pain and suffering, emotional distress, a spouse's loss of 
consortium, and lost quality of life-the latter often referred to  
as hedonic damages. An endorsement of this evaluation is 
found in the Analysis to the Model Uniform Product Liability 
Act which suggests that awards for pain and suffering "have no 
market value and, thus, are to be contrasted with pecuniary 
damages which compensate victims for lost wages, medical and 
rehabilitation costs, and other actual expenditures has or will 
incur due to injuries caused by a defective product."49 
B .  Personal Physical Injury 
All jurisdictions permit the personal injury plaintiff recov- 
ery for pain and suffering.50 Restatement Second, Torts $ 924 
confirms that the prevailing plaintiff may recover damages for 
past or prospective "bodily harm and emotional distress[;] *** 
loss or  impairment of earning capacity[;] *** reasonable medical 
47 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASE AND MATERIALS ON TORTS $5 4.4-.7 
(6th ed. 1995). 
48 Id. at !j 17.2 ("[Tlhe bywords in establishing the law of damages are com- 
pensation, deterrence, and consistency."). 
49 Model Uniform Product Liability Act 118(D) (Analysis), 44 Fed.Reg. 
62746 (Oct. 31, 1979). 
50 EPSTEIN supra note 47, a t  !j 17.2 ("All jurisdictions recognize a right to re- 
cover damages for bodily injuries, generally defined to cover 'any impairment of 
the physical condition, including illness and physical pain."'), quoting RESTATE- 
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 cmt. b. E.g., Lakin v. Senco Products, 329 Or. 62 
(Or. 1999). 
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and other expenses; and *** harm to property and business 
caused by the invasion."51 Thus, it is agreed generally that the 
successful plaintiff in a tort personal injury claim can recover 
provable damage to property, for personal injury, illness, or 
death, or for mental or emotional harm accompanying plaintiffs 
placement in direct physical peril by such a the defendant's ac- 
tions.52 Plaintiffs personal injury damages are recognized gen- 
erally to  include "medical expenses, loss of future earnings, 
permanent disability or disfigurement, and damages for past 
and future mental pain and suffering."53 The general rule is 
that the injured plaintiff may be awarded compensatory dam- 
ages without proof of pecuniary loss.54 
For personal physical injuries involving a reduction or 
elimination of the plaintiffs ability to earn a livelihood, the 
claimant may recover damages for loss of future earnings. Such 
injuries are recoverable in tort, because, as they are associated 
with personal injury, they are not precluded by application of 
the rule ordinarily applied to "pure economic 1 0 ~ s . " ~ ~  Accord- 
ingly, in determining the size of such an award, it is agreed gen- 
erally that the finder of fact may consider plaintiffs loss of 
earning ability, loss of future earning capacity, work life expec- 
tancy, age, life expectancy, investment income, inflation, pre- 
dictable productivity increase, prospects for rehabilitation, and 
probable future earning capacity.56 
C .  Increased Risk of Future Illness 
In some jurisdictions a plaintiff whose exposure to  a pro- 
cess, often a process that contaminates the environment, ele- 
vates his risk of contracting an injury or disease in the future 
- - - - -- 
51 See generally Thomas W. Long, Economic Impairment in Personal Injury 
Actions, 30 SO.TEX.L.REV. 97 1989); Steven G. Schumaier, Proof of Hearing Loss, 
22 TRIAL 32 (1986). 
52 See N.J.Rev.Stat. $ 1(1), Ch. 197. 
53 E.g., Adkins v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 18 F.3d 1349 (6th Cir.1994) (asbestos- 
related personal injury action). 
54 See, e.g., Croteau v. Olin Corp., 644 F.Supp. 208 (D.N.H.1986). 
55 The "economic loss" rule provides generally that economic loss that  is not 
associated with personal physical injury or damage to property cannot be recover- 
able in  tort. Rather, such "pure" economic loss claims may only be pursued in 
warranty or other contract claims. 
56 E.g., Lanclos v. Rockwell International Corp., 470 So.2d 924, 934(La. Ct. 
App.1985); Robertson v. Superior PMI, Inc., 791 F.2d 402 (5th Cir.1986). 
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may seek a monetary award for incurring the increased risk. 
Where a claimant can show existing illness or disease that is 
understood by sound medical science to  be a precursor of the 
future injury or disease feared, many jurisdictions will permit 
recovery in damages for the increased risk of that future 
di~ease.5~ 
D. Emotional Distress 
Subject to application of state by state standards, courts in 
all jurisdictions permit the award of damages for emotional dis- 
tress associated with plaintiffs personal injury.58 Such recov- 
ery may be secured under any of the conventional doctrines 
under which the finder of fact determines an award to be allow- 
able, be it negligence, warranty, or strict tort liability. 
E.  Fear of Future Illness 
Distinct questions of recoverability and proof are posed by 
the emotional distress claims of the plaintiff who is "at risk" of 
illness due to antecedent exposure to a long latency disease-in- 
ducing substance due to  another's claimed negligence. The is- 
sue posed is how, if at all, may the person exposed to, for 
example, respirable asbestos, or a contaminated water source, 
or whose mother was prescribed a synthetic estrogen during 
pregnancy, articulate a claim for damages for the reasonable 
apprehension of future illness. A claim for increased risk of fu- 
ture disease differs from a claim for fear of such future illness. 
The former is based solely upon the probability upon the medi- 
cal probability of the future illness, and in this sense permits 
recovery to the plaintiff who has involuntarily been denied a 
future without an unreasonable risk of harm from defendant's 
product or process. The latter claim, for reasonable fear or ap- 
prehension of the manifestation of a future illness, represents a 
claim for emotional distress damages. 
F .  Property Damage 
In tort suits, including negligence actions, compensatory 
damages will be considered appropriate for plaintiffs injury or 
57 E.g., Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 469 A.2d 655, 659 (Pa. Super. 1993). 
58 See comment to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $46.  
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loss due to harm to his property, or to the loss or diminution of 
individual or business earning capacity, but only upon proof of 
the actual pecuniary loss.59 In a products liability claim, to use 
one model, physical damage the defective product causes to the 
user's other property should be compensable in a cause of action 
brought either in negligence or in strict liability, or as conse- 
quential damages in warranty.60 
The ordinary measurement for tortious damage to property 
is the calculation of the value of the property immediately pre- 
ceding the loss, less the value following the loss, plus appropri- 
ate compensation for plaintiffs deprivation of the property or 
loss of ~ s e . 6 ~  When the loss to plaintiffs property amounts to 
total destruction, plaintiff will be entitled to damages measured 
by the difference between the value of the property before the 
loss and after the harm, or the reasonable cost of repair or res- 
toration, and the loss of ~ s e . ~ 2  
VI. COLOMBLAN DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 
A. Generally 
As is the case for most Latin American countries, Colom- 
bia's jurisprudence is based largely upon its civil code; thus, its 
approach to tor t  law liability differs from common law coun- 
tries, such as the United States.63 Unlike Anglo-American ju- 
risprudence, which uses case law as primary authority in the 
development of its legal principles, such as the doctrine negli- 
gence, Colombian jurisprudence does not follow precedent as a 
primary authority of its laws. Cases are decided based on the 
particular facts of the case at  hand, and the court's ruling is not 
binding on future decisions even if the facts of the later case 
mirror that of the prior case. 
59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 906: "Damages for causing a loss of 
earning capacity are not necessarily based upon what the plaintiff has done or 
would have done, but are based upon the amount by which the earning capacity of 
the plaintiff has been reduced through the conduct of the tortfeasor." 
60 See, e.g., Z-J Corp. v Tice, 126 F.3d 539 (3rd Cir. 1997) (allowing recovery in 
negligence and strict liability for "other* property). 
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 927(a), (b), (c). 
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $928. 
63 M.C. Mirow, The Power of Codification in Latin America: Simon Bolivar 
and the Code Napoleon, TUL. J .  INYL & COMP. L., 83, 83 (2000). 
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This analysis of the Colombian notion of negligence is 
based on four primary texts written by Colombian legal schol- 
ars. They all agree that in its basic form, the term liability sug- 
gests a link between individuals.64 It is a term that suggests a 
nexus between two people- he who causes the harm and he 
who suffers it. The term liability is used to describe the duty to 
assume the consequences of an act, an occurrence or a form of 
conduct.65 
Non-contractual duty arises when a person wrongs or 
harms another or its belongings. This form of liability arises 
where there is no contractual nexus between the two. Non-con- 
tractual civil liability is divided into direct or personal liability 
and indirect or complex liability. Indirect liability refers to vi- 
carious liability or acts made with the aid of machines that are 
used in dangerous activities. These forms of liability are codi- 
fied in the Colombian Civil Code. Personal liability is stated in 
Article 2341, third party liability is stated in Article 2347, lia- 
bility due to the acts of an animal is stated in Article 2353, lia- 
bility arising out of the use of machines is stated in Articles 
2350 and 2355, and liability arising out of dangerous activities 
is stated in Article 2356.66 
The Colombian legislature maintains a division in the 
treatment of contractual versus non-contractual liability. This 
differential treatment is shown in the separate codification of 
these two forms of liability in the Colombian Civil Code. 
B. The Unicistas v. The Dualistas 
There are two theories of liability among Colombian schol- 
ars. The first theory is the Unicista (unity) theory.67 This the- 
ory reinforces that both types of liability come from a breach of 
duty or obligation (responsabilidad). The fact that one arises 
out of a contractual obligation and the other does not should not 
be a factor in determining liability.68 The second theory is the 
64 See HUMBERTO CUELLAR GUTIERREZ, RESPONSABILIDAD CML EXTRACON- 
TRACTUAL (1983); JUAN CARLOS HENAO, EL D-O; GILBERTO MARTINEZ RAVE, RE- 
SPONS~BILIDAD CML EXTRACONTRACTUAL (10th ed. 1998); JAVIER TAMAYO 
JARAMILLO, 2 DE LA RESPONSIBILIDAD CML (1989). 
65 See ~ T I N E Z  RAVE, supra note 64, at 3. 
66 See MARTINEZ RAVE, supra note 64, at 1-50. 
67 See id. at 17. 
68 See id. 
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Dualista (dual) theory. This is the conventional Colombian the- 
ory. It seeks to treat liability in terms of the obligations as- 
sumed either by contract or by law in two separate ca teg~r ies .~~  
Irrespective of the theory adopted, in either situation the 
act that causes the harm or injury does not have to be an illicit 
act. The trigger to liability lies in the modification or alteration 
of the previous state of a thing or person. In contractual liabil- 
ity there are different levels of breach. There is only one level 
for breach non-contractual liability. "Culpa" which translates 
into fault, is also used when referring to civil liability. Culpa 
must be proved under Civil code Article 2341 but it is presumed 
under Articles 2347, 2350, 2353, 2355, and 2356.70 
The study and development of non-contractual liability in 
Colombia in the modern times has also looked at risks (riesgos) 
when identifying the elements of liability. In the past, Colom- 
bian law had a subjective approach towards the elements neces- 
sary to establish liability. In the study of non-contractual 
liability there are two interests at stake: the progress of tech- 
nology and the welfare of the public in general from the use or 
misuse of this technology. In this quest, Martinez questions the 
Colombian legal system's ability to handle these interests and 
still uphold the rights of the injured.71 
C. Impact of Science and Technology in  Colombian 
Jurisprudence: Jaramillos' Approach 
Jaramillo states that the scientific and technological ad- 
vances of the past few decades have obligated and permitted 
that the laws regarding liability for negligent acts undergo a 
radical change. The scholar posits that most of the principles 
guiding negligence liability of fifty years ago are not applicable 
today. In effect, transportation in general and objects used in 
everyday life have made it almost impossible for the victim to be 
able to demonstrate the fault (culpa) by the responsible party.72 
Based on this proposition, Colombian jurisprudence has at- 
tempted to mitigate this problem, for example, in cases of dan- 
gerous activities, the victim only has to show that the 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. 
72 See TAMAYO JARAMILLO, supra note 64, at  1. 
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occurrence caused by the defendant was the triggering factor of 
his injuries and harm. Legislators have tried to free the victim 
from the procedural burdens of proof that bring the element of 
fault into the equation for sustaining a negligence liability 
claim.73 Social Utility theory is also present in Colombian law 
as it accepts the harms posed by technology (tecnologia mean- 
ing man-made structures, products, or mechanical fixtures) 
upon the individual in order to  improve society as a whole. 
D. Duty 
Chile's Civil Code, written by Andres Bellos, served as 
guide to Colombia's Civil Code.74 Both codes followed the 
French model regarding non-contractual liability, the Napole- 
onic Code.75 Both codes, however, left out the following words, 
which were present in the Napoleonic Code, Article 1384 "we 
are responsible (liable) of the things that we have under our 
care (custody)." These few words have had a great impact in the 
development of Colombian law. Without these words the victim 
was left with the burden of proving fault or breach when deal- 
ing with other than direct or personal negligence cases.76 
Through the use of technology and scientific development, 
the role and importance of direct liability as stated in Article 
2341 of the Colombian Civil Code has decreased. As potential 
liability arising out of dangerous activities increases, the inter- 
pretation and application of Article 2356 is also elevated. A vic- 
tim of a civil non-contractual wrongdoing fares best if he can 
establish that his harm and injuries arose out of defendant's 
engagement in a dangerous activity defined by Article 2356. If 
the claimant is successful in establishing the claim, the liabil- 
ity, or breach of due care is presumed by law. This is an impor- 
tant advantage for the victim who now does not have to prove 
defendant's fault or guilt.77 
According to  Tamayo Jaramillo, the words left out from the 
Napoleonic Code, Article 1383 "one is responsible (liable) for the 
things that we have under our care (custody)," while not stated 
73 See generally id. at ch. 2. 
74 See Mirow, supra note 63, at 83. 
75 See id. at 83-4. 
76 See TAMAYO JARAMILLO, supra note 64, at 2. 
77 See id. at 8-9. 
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expressly in the Article, are given implicit effect in another arti- 
cle of the Colombian Civil Code Article 669. Thus, arguably, it 
operates as a means of avoiding the issue of, the predicate 
showing of which predominated, in the early stages of Colom- 
bian jurisprudence. Article 669 of the Civil Code defines the 
word dominion as follows: "dominion [that is also called prop- 
erty] is the right to a corporal [material] thing, to enjoy and dis- 
pose of arbitrarily, as long as it is not against the law or against 
the rights of others." These words allow for the interpretation 
that intruding upon the rights of others does not require the 
element of fault, thereby negating the proposition that it is 
needed in non-contractual liability.78 
VII. DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES 
It 1938 Colombia was introduced to the theory of civil lia- 
bility for dangerous activities, which today is codified by Article 
2356 and translated below. By dangerous activities (ac- 
tividades peligrosas) is meant human pursuits that crate a high 
and unavoidable risk of great harm. Up to 1938, Colombian 
courts hewed to the principle of fault, which is present in the 
French legal system. The historical development of this theory 
arises out of the work of a lawyer by the name of Eduardo 
Zuleta, who through his arguments in front of the Supreme 
Court was able to introduce this theory to the Colombian juris- 
prudence. Later, Carlos Ducci Claro, in his doctorate thesis 
published in 1936, invoked the teachings of Zuleta, and further 
developed this theory.79 
Article 2356 presumes the liability of the defendant. He 
can only be exonerated by a break in the causation link, such as 
an act of force rnajeure. There were many debates among Co- 
lombian scholars as to whether the use of the risk theory should 
play a role in this type of liability, or whether the principle 
should be that of objectivism. Whether the risk theory or the 
objective theory is applied, one thing remains consistent: the 
person engaging in the dangerous activity bears the burden of 
exonerating himself from liability.80 
78 See id. at 40-41. 
79 See id. at 52-53. 
80 See id. at 53-54. 
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The test of Article 2356 demands that there be malice or 
negligence on the part of the responsible party. This require- 
ment is founded on the notion of fault. The fact that fault is 
presumed or proved is a matter of legal interpretation. One 
thing is certain, according to Tamayo Jaramillo, to wit, the risk 
theory is adoptive in nature and does not have its roots in the 
Colombian jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has debated 
over the elements needed to point down the responsible party to 
a dangerous activity. The modern trend is to hold he who has 
the "intellectual direction and control over the dangerous 
activity."81 
A. Civil Code Article 2356 
The translation to this Article is as follows: 
Article 2356 Obligations arising out of dangerous activities. As a 
general rule all harm resulting from the malice of negligence of 
another person must be compensated by the obligator. 
Particularly obligated to reparation are: 
1) He who imprudently fires a firearm; 
2) He that removes things from a pipe or sewer line, or leaves 
them open in a street or highway, without the precautions 
needed to prevent the injury (falling) of its transients either 
day or night; 
3) He who does construction or reparations to aqueducts or foun- 
tains that cross roads, has it in a state that could cause harm 
to those traveling the roads.S2 
The Article further states that there is a presumption of guilt on 
those who engage in dangerous activities. This is due to the 
81 Id. at  60. 
82 Art. 2356: Responsabilidad por actividades peligrosas. Por regla general 
todo daiio que se pueda imputarse a malicia o negligencia de otra personon, debe 
ser reprado por esta. 
Son especialmente obligados a esta reparacion: 
1) El que dispara imprudentemente un arma de fuego; 
2) El que remueve las cosas de una acequia o caneria, o las descubre 
en calle o en camino, sin las precauciones necesarias para que no 
caigan 10s que por alli transiten de dia o de noche; 
El que obligado a la construccion or reparacio de un acueducto o 
fuente, que atraviesa un camino, lo tiene en estado de causar daiio a 10s 
que transitan por el camino. 
COLOMBIAN CML CODE, k t .  2356. 
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consideration that it is not the victim but the defendant who 
creates the danger to third parties by engaging in an activity, 
which although licit, in its nature implicates risks of such a na- 
ture that the imminent occurrence of harm explains and vali- 
dates this p re~umpt ion .~~  
B. Automobile Accidents 
Automobile accidents have constituted one of the most 
abundant sources of Colombian personal injury litigation. 
Humberto Cuellar Gutierrez summarizes different forms of ac- 
cidents, which contain a negligent act. Some of these examples 
include, running a red light and speeding. Both of these situa- 
tions contain both a criminal act and a civil wrongdoing. The 
modern doctrine, Gutierrez states, finds that there is only one 
difference between the criminal and civil wrongdoing, that of 
degree and not of the nature of the wrongdoing itself. As above- 
mentioned, Article 2356 of the Civil Code defines what Colom- 
bian law refers to as dangerous activities. To drive an 
automobile is considered a form of dangerous activity.S4 
The elements for negligence for this type of activity are as 
follows: First, there must be an accident. Second, the accident 
must be occasioned by the dangerous activity. Third, the victim 
is not obligated to demonstrate the culpability of the author of 
the injurious act. Fourth, the person liable must be responsible 
for the dangerous activity. Lastly, the accident cannot be the 
result of force majeure, fault of a third party, or the fault of the 
victim.a5 
Savatier defines an accident as the "abnormal fact and un- 
foreseeable that has been produced thus bringing with it the 
injury." Cuellar Gutierrez states that he would complete the 
concept by adding the words "as a result of a dangerous activ- 
ity." This addition to the definition allows people to make the 
first distinction: the responsibility or liability defined in Article 
2356, refers to injuries caused by automobiles, and is not appli- 
cable when the injury does not come from the accident itself. 
Injuries must be caused by the exercise of the dangerous activ- 
ity and thus liability and duty of care arise from the same activ- 
83 See id. 
s4 See HUMBERTO CUELLAR GUTIERREZ, supra note 64, at ch. 15. 
85 See id. 
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ity, not of fault, thus it is not necessary to prove non-contractual 
liability.86 
In many instances, where there is an accident in land 
transportation, the obligation or liability will be contractual in 
kind. If a passenger is injured, the legal claim is made pursu- 
ant to the Code of Commerce, in particular, Articles 982, 992 
and 1003. If the passenger dies before exercising his rights, his 
family will be allowed to commence a contractual hereditary 
claim (hereditaria contractual). The death of the passenger also 
allows his family to maintain a personal non-contractual negli- 
gence claim. This action is based upon the injury they suffered 
in relationship to the death of their family member, i.e., lost 
earnings (lucro cesante). If a transporter causes injuries to a 
pedestrian, however, his liability will be non-contractual and 
will be applied under Article 2356.S7 
VIII. BREACH 
For an occurrence or act to give rise to civil liability, the act 
or occurrence (hecho) does not have to be illicit in nature or un- 
lawful (delictivo) or intentional. Traditionally, the act that gave 
rise to fault needed to be unlawful. Today the law divides these 
acts into delictivo and cuasidelictivo. Acts, which are consid- 
ered cuasidelictivo, are those that occur due to a mistake in con- 
duct, which in turn, result in injury, or results that were not 
sought after. Martinez disagrees with the traditional use of the 
word delito (crime) when referring to  civil liability. In his view, 
the word delito should only be used in the context for which it 
was created, criminal law.88 
There is considerable debate among Colombian scholars as 
to whether fault should be part of the equation for civil liability. 
The word fault or guilt translated into Spanish is culpa. The 
same word is used in describing tortious conduct and criminal 
conduct. The word culpa was used because there is no uniform 
definition to describe breach of duty.89 To some Colombian 
Scholars the term culpa imports not only fault or guilt, but also 
breach. Pursuant to  such an interpretation, the breach must 
86 See generally MARTINEZ RAVE, supra note 64. 
87 See generally TAMAYO JARAMILLO, supra note 64. 
88 See MARTINEZ RAVE, supra note 64, at ch. 7. 
89 See id. at  ch. 10. 
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have an objective factor that refers to awareness or free will of 
the actor. To this date, however, culpa is based on a subjective 
standard. It looks at the internal conditions surrounding the 
breach of each individual. Martinez's text refers to some of 
these objectivists scholars' definition of the word breach. Sera- 
tier defined breach as the breach of a duty that the actor was 
aware existed and could not observe. The Mazeud brothers de- 
fined breach as a mistake of conduct that a prudent person 
under similar circumstances would not make. The aforemen- 
tioned theorists believe that we should look at breach in the ab- 
stract light, which they call objective fault. Objective fault 
looks at  the prudent man as its model, the careful man, a "good 
family man." Martinez cautions that this term should not be 
confused with "objective liability" or strict liability, which does 
not require the element of fault or breach.90 
The objective fault approach is the modern view of liability 
embraced by Colombian scholars. Notwithstanding this newest 
view, the Colombian legal system is still based on subjective 
fault. The subjective fault has criminal liability as its roots. 
Despite the Colombian attempt to  modify its notion to civil lia- 
bility, Martinez believes that the principle and the required 
showing of subjective fault will die out. To him, objective fault 
is the next step in the progress and development of civil 
liability. 
Within the objective fault movement, there are many de- 
bates regarding the management of fault. To some, the element 
of culpa should be eliminated altogether. To others, liability 
will be proven if the hecho or negligent occurrence is proven to- 
gether with the injury. Martinez believes that an adequate in- 
terpretation for Colombia would be to treat breach as presumed 
in all cases where the other elements are proven by the injured. 
In this case, the defendant can escape liability if he can demon- 
strate that he acted with diligence and due care. In other cases, 
which are expressly stated in the Civil Code Article 2356, for 
example, liability should be presumed. The defendant in this 
situation can escape liability by establishing a break in the cau- 
sation link. Unlike the American origin of negligence, Colom- 
bian negligence principles emerged with the question of "fault" 
90 See id. 
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as the first element of the negligence claim. This is of course, 
an imitation of the Napoleonic Code's treatment of "fault."gl 
Non-contractual liability in Colombian law has as its goal 
to  deal with the issue of injuries or harm suffered by an individ- 
ual in a legal and ordered fashion. The incorporation of this 
notion into the law allows for society to develop rules regarding 
human risk and the consequences of acts that arise out of the 
risks.92 There is no consensus among Colombian scholars as to 
which element of liability to highlight in the study of non-con- 
tractual liability. The Colombian author Juan Carlos Henao 
states that in dealing with this form of liability, the first ele- 
ment that must be studied is the injury or harm suffered by the 
victim.93 
According to  Henao, in dealing with negligence liability, 
there are many ways to look at liability. The key is in determin- 
ing which element of liability one chooses to study first. Colom- 
bian jurisprudence, particularly prior to  the 1991 Constitution, 
insisted that in order for civil liability to arise, one must show 
that there was a breach. Concurrently, the injury had to be both 
present and tied or linked to of causation. Today, Henao states, 
the focus has shifted to the element of injury, because in some 
cases, fault is not always an element or requirement for liability 
to exist. As Dean Hinestrosa states in the prologue to Henao's 
text: 
[Tlhe injury is the reason liability exists, and that is why, it is 
imperative that it is explore in its distinct aspects and degree; for 
it should occupy the first place in a logical and chronological 
sense, in the minds of judges. If there is no injury, or it can't be 
determined or evaluated, that should be the end; any further ef- 
fort, relative to the act or actor or moral qualification of the con- 
duct will be futile.94 
Henao echoes this proposition by stating that the harm suf- 
fered should be the first element to be discussed in the equation 
91 See id. 
92 See HENAO, supra note 64, at ch. 2.  
93 See id. 
94 See id. 
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of civil liability. If a person has not been injured or harmed, he 
should not be favored by a judgment that would unjustly enrich 
him without cause. The injury is the cause for reparation, and 
reparation or compensation is the finality of civil liability. 
Henao criticizes judgments by the Colombian "Consejo de Es- 
tado" which imposes its primary judgments based on a lack of 
service or fault. For example, in a judgment dated October 2, 
1996, the Consejo de Estado affirmed, "in an event of sub iudice 
llack of service], the injury does not have to be proven by the 
person claiming the harm." According to Henao, this case rep- 
resents the inadequacy of treating injury as a subsequent ele- 
ment of civil liability. Notwithstanding the importance of first 
determining the injury or harm suffered by the victim, it should 
be noted that a showing of injury alone does not give rise to civil 
liability.95 
The person claiming the injury or harm must prove the in- 
jury exists. As a starting point, Article 177 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure affirms that "the legislator has established that it is 
the duty of the parties to prove the claimed tortious act or con- 
duct (hecho) of the norms that allow the judicial effect that they 
seek." Therefore, it is not enough for the claimant to state that 
she has suffered an injury; it must be proven in court. One ex- 
ception to this rule applies when dealing with lost earnings 
(lucro cesante) pertaining to an individual who has been injured 
or  has died. The judge will presume an injury when computing 
lost earnings sought by those who are economically dependent 
on that individual and have suffered an injury as a result of the 
victim's injuries. The standard of proof to determine the value 
of the lucro cesante is not the same standard required to prove 
an injury was sustained. Nevertheless, this treatment of the 
element of injury shows a departure from the American treat- 
ment of negligence. 
In a personal injury complaint, it  is customary for a plain- 
tiffs attorney not to include a money amount for the total dam- 
ages sought. Instead, the attorney will include generic 
language in the complaint. This procedure regarding the ques- 
95 Id. 
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tions of damages leaves the judge ample discretion in the deter- 
mination of damage awards. An example is illustrated in a case 
where a minor suffered brain damage due to a gunshot, for 
which he underwent several surgeries. The minor did not fully 
recover from the injuries suffered. The Consejo de Estado or- 
dered the defendant to pay the minor's health care bills for the 
life of the minor together with any psychological treatment he 
may need in the future. It is seen that the court may acknowl- 
edge not only the damages that can be proved at the time of the 
trial, but also the long term damaged that many not be assessa- 
ble at  the time of the trial.96 
Another case pointed out by Henao is the case of a victim of 
a negligent occurrence (hecho). He became 86% incapacitated 
and remained in a paraplegic state. The normal equation for 
damages in lost future earnings would have been based on the 
aforementioned percentage. Notwithstanding, the Consejo de 
Estado held that due to the high percentage of incapacity, the 
percentage to be used in this case should be 100%. This, the 
Estado noted, was justified by the necessity to  cover the contin- 
uous damage suffered by the injured and the assistance he will 
need in living with the injuries sustained.97 
As stated above, Colombian law deals with the notion of 
damages or indemnification, based on the proposition that the 
injured should be put back in the position he was in prior to the 
negligent act, or as closely to it as possible. Unlike the law of 
most United States jurisdictions, under Colombian law, injured 
parties in cases of personal injury arising out of non-contractual 
liability do not include the recognition of punitive damages. 
Henao states the unavailability of exemplary damages allows 
for the injured to be made whole again without unjustly enrich- 
ing the injured. While the two systems diverge on the question 
of punitive damages, the civil code and common law approaches 
alike are in agreement that the objective of such causes of ac- 
tion is to permit the meritorious plaintiff to be returned, in how- 
ever imperfect manner money damages can do so, to his or her 
original condition. Indeed, it is fair to state that corrective jus- 
tice is part of both Colombia and the United States equation for 
negligence. 
96 Id. at 84. 
97 See id. 
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Henao writes that the United States' treatment of punitive 
damages has as its object to calm or comfort the injured for its 
mental anguish, feelings, degradation, etc. He states that com- 
pensatory damages are based upon the policy objective of pub- 
licly punishing the tortfeasor. Should a losing defendant be 
called upon to pay a substantial sum to the prevailing plaintiff, 
Henao suggests, the defendant is made an example to others 
who may be engaging in similar activities. In other words, com- 
pensatory damages are used as a public deterrent.98 Although 
punitive damages are not often used in the contemporary Co- 
lombian approach to liability, the influential authors concur 
that as technology continues to develop, the concept of exem- 
plary damage awards will be incorporated into Colombian juris- 
prudence, even if not expressly inserted into their Civil Code. 
Furthermore, Henao argues that the application of the 
aforementioned types of punitive damages do not exist "in the- 
ory" in the continental system, which system's gravitational 
pull can be recognized in much Colombian law. The Colombian 
objective is to indemnify or compensate the injured for the harm 
sustained. In contrast, by entertaining the potential of an 
award of both compensatory damages and punitive damages, 
the law of most United States jurisdictions is to provide com- 
pensation for the wrongfully injured, and further, in instances 
of extreme misconduct by the defendant, permit a quasi-crimi- 
nal penalty that serves both to punish the defendant and to 
make a public statement as to the unacceptability of such 
behavior. 
Under Colombian law, compensation for injuries sustained 
must be made fully. Nevertheless, according to Henao, compen- 
sation should be limited to the injury actually suffered and 
proved. In the words of the Colombian Supreme Court "pay- 
ment for damages must directly correspond with the magnitude 
of the injury suffered, thus can not be any higher." The expla- 
nation to this notion lies in the public belief that there should 
not be unjust enrichment to the party injured. Again, Henao, in 
the context of punitive damages, contrasts the United States' 
public punishment of tortfeasors by the awarding of enormous 
often bearing no discernible relationship to the harm actually 
9s See HENAO, supra note 64, at 84. 
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suffered. In his discussion of damages, and in relationship to 
the concept of unjust enrichment, Henao also considers the is- 
sue of subrogation under Colombian law. He analyzes the situ- 
ation in which an injured individual receives compensation 
from other sources. The compensation by other sources (other 
than the tortfeasor) lowers the threshold of damages actually 
suffered. In Colombia, the term used to describe this type of 
situation is called compensatio lucri cum damno. This issue 
arises when other parties contribute to the indemnification of 
the damages. Examples of these forms of compensation are so- 
cial security and private insurance policies. In the aforemen- 
tioned situations, the injured can conceivably end up in a better 
situation, in other words, unjust enrichment may occur as a re- 
sult of the payment of damages by other and collateral sources. 
According to Henao, the Consejo de Estado has stated that even 
though unjust enrichment does not form part of the equation for 
computing damages, there may be situations where this enrich- 
ment may be legally justified.99 
Payments of employment insurance policies or social secur- 
ity benefits legally belonging to the injured party or his family 
does not prevent the injured from recovering damages from the 
negligent party. Henao contrasts this view with that of France. 
In France, these sources indeed limit the amount of recovery an 
injured party may receive from the tortfeasor. One exception to  
this rule occurs with respect to negligence insurance, where it 
expressly calls for subrogation in accordance with Article 1096 
of the Colombian Commerce Code. According to Henao, discrep- 
ancies between supplemental indemnification and negligence 
contracts arise as a result of the Colombian legislature's deci- 
sion to differentiate the two. This leaves the courts powerless to  
allow for supplemental compensation where there is an insur- 
ance contract, which contains subrogation clauses. 
There are different types of damages which entitle the in- 
jured to compensation. The first type of damage is material. It 
presupposes an economic loss. The second harm is moral in na- 
ture, and does not contain an economic value. Colombian juris- 
prudence has sustained that this distinction must be used to  
guide the analysis of the types of damages in relationship to 
99 See id.at ch. 3. 
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their compensation. Notwithstanding, the types of damages as 
outlined above can present confusion. It allows one to think 
that all damage that does not have an economic or pecuniary 
nature must be moral. Under Colombian law, the compensation 
of "physical harm or in relation to life" was added only in 1993. 
Henao argues that the better classification would be to say that 
moral damages are a kind of non-pecuniary damage. In light of 
the foregoing, the classification of damages should be done in 
terms of economic versus non-economi~.~~~ 
In Colombian law, another distinction is made between 
damages that are patrimonial versus non-patrimonial. Under 
the economic damages are two sub-categories: the lucro cesante 
and daiio emergente, both, which are patrimonial. Under the 
non-patrimonial damages are included the moral injury and 
physical injury. The judge decides both types. He has the dis- 
cretion to  decide the injury's classification and the amount of 
compensation the injured will receive for each type of injury. As 
to personal but non-physical injuries (daiios morales), Colom- 
bian legal scholars refer to as moral injuries can be classified as 
the equivalent of American damages for pain and suffering. 
Economic damages are those that deal with personal prop- 
erty or economic interests, which is to say, they are measurable 
in terms of money. Colombian law, perhaps due to Articles 
1613 and 1614 of the Civil Code, differentiate between lucro 
cesante and daiio emergente. Article 1614 states that daiio 
emergente arises out of "the damage or loss that arises of an 
obligation that was not fulfilled, of erroneous fulfillment, or 
tardy fulfillment." The daiio emergente encompasses the loss of 
patrimonial property, the gains that this property would have 
brought to the individual. Lucro cesante refers to the earnings 
that stop from accruing due to the damage aforementioned. 
These types of damages are applicable in both contractual and 
non-contractual obligations. Henao distinguishes between the 
two by stating that the daiio emergente produces a 
"desembolso" an out of pocket damage, while the lucro cesante 
produces a "no embolso" damage, meaning there is nothing be- 
ing pocketed which would have been but for the injury or harm 
sustained. The Mazeud brothers refer to  lucro cesante as the 
100 HENAO, supm note 64, at 191. 
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"perdida sufrida" or loss suffered and "ganancia frustrada" or 
frustrated earnings. lo1 
A. El Daiio Emergente 
As previously stated this type of damage presents itself 
when it is a physical injury suffered by the individual. Exam- 
ples given by Henao representing daiio emergente are as fol- 
lows: (1) The victim dies as a result of the injury. His family 
must incur all expenses related to the victim's burial. Those 
costs are an example of the daiios emergentes. (2) If the victim 
survives, all the expenses incurred in the rehabilitation of the 
victim are considered daiios emergentes. Daiios emergentes 
can also arise out of harm to one's belongings. When the injuri- 
ous act affects belongings, the judge applies the same logic for 
reparation of the damage as used in the damage to the physical 
damage suffered by the individual.lo2 
B. El Lucro Cesante 
As stated by Henao, when the integrity of a person is at- 
tacked there are effects that must be compensated. When an 
individual dies as a result of the negligence of another, his fam- 
ily is entitled to compensation for their out-of-pocket losses or 
expenses (el daiio emergente) but also for the losses that will be 
sustained by the family due to the injury or death of the family's 
economic provider. Their loss in terms of monetary reparation 
refers to the economic dependence family members may have 
had on the decedent. When the daiio emergente is a damage 
done to  an object or thing, the Courts look to see the amount of 
earnings lost as a result of the harm or damage.lo3 
For a long time, the Supreme Court and the Consejo de Es- 
tad0 sustained that non-patrimonial damages constituted only 
moral damages. It was not until the 1990's that non-patrimo- 
nial damages were broadened to include more than moral dam- 
ages. In the case decided on February 14, 1992, the court 
awarded a judgment of 1.800 grams of gold for moral damages. 
This amount was higher then the traditional 1.000 gram courts 
lol See id. at 197. 
102 See id. at 210-14. 
'03 Id. at 223-224. 
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had previously awarded. Despite the fact that the decision only 
referred to the compensation of moral damages, it was inferred 
that the judge was awarding damages that were outside the 
scope of moral damages.104 
The definitive recognition of non-material damages took 
place in the case decided on May 6, 1993. A year after the Con- 
sejo de Estado amplified "physical damages" as a synonym of 
"injury to the relationship of life," this case affirmed that "it is 
necessary to recognize the award for physical damage or to the 
damage to the relationship to life. This form of damage must be 
distinguished from material damage, which encompasses both 
daiio emergente and lucro cesante, and also must be distin- 
guished from subjective moral damages."l05 Recognition of this 
type of compensable harm remains an uphill fight. When, for 
example, a boy suffers an injury that will leave him blind for 
the rest of his life, or limited to a wheel chair, the amount and 
logic of the award of damages for pain and suffering may be- 
come enmeshed in the amount and rationale of the award of 
material damages. Further employing the above hypothetical, 
perhaps the blinded boy will require the aide of a guide dog. 
Should a part of any monetary award be considered an award to 
compensate for his physical injury, or is it more appropriately 
considered an award for dafio emergente? Is it an award for 
pain and suffering? Since 1998, there have been 35 cases where 
the right to an "objective" award for pain and suffering has been 
given. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
Non-contractual civil liability under Colombian law is cur- 
rently struggling, as Colombian jurisprudence maintains 
archaic notions of guilt and fault in determining civil liability. 
As seen above, Colombian legal scholars are unable to  identify 
and clearly define the elements needed to  achieve a unified no- 
tion of non-contractual liability. This struggle has as one of its 
components the influence of French law, which Colombia modi- 
fied in an attempt suit the Colombian needs regarding the 
structure of civil liability. Another component is exemplified by 
104 See TAMAYO JARAMILLO, supra note 64. 
105 Id.  at 265 (trans. from Spanish). 
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the need to modernize the terms and the usage of liability to 
fully compensate victims. Due to  the fear of unjust enrichment, 
often-Colombian victims are leR without the due compensation 
for the injuries they suffer. 
A struggle for legality and compensation are reflected in 
the texts used in my effort to better understand the legal con- 
cept of non-contractual liability in Colombia. They are ex- 
tremely unclear, filled with thesis's containing no concrete 
answers. The authors' conceptualization of this current vague- 
ness is tempered by the understanding that the concept of non- 
contractual liability in Colombia is at best at  its early stages of 
development. As stated by Henao, it was not until the 1990's 
that the courts fully accepted the concept of pain and suffering 
awards, and today, many cases contain awards that are not eas- 
ily differentiated. 
Colombian negligence law emerged from the Napoleonic 
Code, which it modified to comport with the Chilean Civil Code 
written by Andres Bello.106 By leaving out the words "under its 
care" the Colombian Civil Code created negligence laws that 
used criminal law principles to  attain a desired result - a non- 
contractual liability tort system. This gave rise to the past and 
continued disagreement and confusion among its scholars who 
try to define Colombian negligence laws. Notwithstanding, 
along the way both American and Colombian laws are seeking 
to create a balance between the interest of the injured party and 
society's interest in what might be termed robust personal and 
commercial autonomy. On one hand, Colombian lawyers strug- 
gle to capture the flag of punitive damages for their clients. On 
the other hand, American trial lawyers lobby against business 
efforts to moderate or eliminate such awards. When and where 
will they meet? 
lo6 See id. at 2. 
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